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This Article outlines the year's most significant antitrust developments in thirteen
jurisdictions. A more detailed publication will be released in 2016.
I. Australia
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Competition Policy Review released its final report in March 2015 (Review),
making recommendations about competition policies; institutions; amendments to
Australia's merger review process; and laws regarding cartels, misuse of market power,
exclusive dealing, and the introduction of a concept of "concerted practices."' The
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1. AUSTRALIAN GOVT COMPETITION POLICY REVIEw, The Final Report 18 (Mar. 31, 2015) (Austl.),
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2015/03/Competiton-policy-review-report--online.pdf.
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Australian Government announced that it will implement most recommendations, but will
consult further on proposed amendments to the dominance prohibition.
B. MERGERS
In October, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) approved
cross-acquisitions between a monopoly pay television company and a free-to-air network,
on the basis of strong competition from free-to-air networks and new streaming services
(e.g. Netflix).2 It also approved two major telecommunications acquisitions. It publicly
opposed only one merger clearance application: the proposed acquisition of the Northern
Territory and far north Queensland marine freight business of Toll Marine Logistics
Australia by Sea Swift.) Sea Swift has applied for authorization on public interest grounds
from the Australian Competition Tribunal.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The ACCC commenced proceedings involving serious allegations of bid-rigging
affecting a state government tender process. In July 2015, the Federal Court delivered
judgment in two appeals relating to cartels between agents and principals: one by the
ACCC against the decision in proceedings against Australia and New Zealand Banking
Group, 4 and one by Flight Centre Travel Group.5 The decisions concern the application
of Australia's cartel laws to firms that sell goods and services both directly and through
agents. The ACCC lost both appeals and, in August, sought special leave to appeal.6
In September, the Federal Court ordered Visa to pay penalties of AUD eighteen
million, in addition to costs of AUD two million for unlawful exclusive arrangements for
dynamic currency conversion services on point of sale transactions.7
D. DOMINANCE
In February, the Federal Court dismissed proceedings against Pfizer for alleged misuse
of market power and exclusive dealing in the supply of generic cholesterol-lowering
pharmaceuticals; the ACCC appealed.8 The misuse of market power prohibition attracted
2. Media Release, Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n (ACCC), ACCC To Not Oppose
Foxtel and Ten Acquisitions (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-to-not-oppose-
foxtel-and-ten-acquisitions.
3. Media Release, ACCC, ACCC Opposes Sea Swift Pty Ltd's Proposed Acquisition of Toll Marine
Logistics (Jul. 9, 2015), http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-opposes-sea-swift-pty-ltd's-proposed-
acquisition-of-toll-marine-logistics.
4. Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n v Austl. & N.Z. Banking Grp. Ltd. [2015] FCAFC 103
(Austl.).
5. Flight Ctr. Ltd. v Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n [2015] FCAFC 104 (Austl.).
6. Media Release, ACCC, ACCC Applies For Special Leave to Appeal the High Court from the Full
Federal Court Flight Centre Judgment (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-applies-
for-special-leave-to-appeal-to-the-high-court-from-the-full-federal-court-flight-centre-judgment.
7. Media Release, ACCC, Visa Ordered to Pay $18 Million Penalty for Ant-Competitive Conduct
Following ACCC Action (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/visa-ordered-to-pay-18-
nillion-penalty-for-anti-competitive-conduct-following-acc-acion.
8. Media Release, ACCC, ACCC Appeals Pfizer Decision (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.accc.gov.au/
media-release/accc-appeals-pfizer-decision.
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extensive debate in the Australian business community and media in the wake of the
Government's announcement for further consultation, following the release of a
discussion paper. A final position on reform is expected for March 2016.
II. Brazil
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 2015, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) launched its
electronic information system (SEI), making case records available online.9 It published
guidelines on "gun-jumping" and permitted consultations on guidelines for compliance
programs and leniency.
CADE approved a resolution allowing interested parties to request a consultation on
the application and interpretation of antitrust law in specific cases.1 0 It also approved a
resolution to allow parties to file petitions online" (currently, only mergers can be filed
online).
B. MERGERS
In January, CADE approved the global acquisition of Veyance Technologies by
Continental AG.12 The parties agreed to structural remedies in Mexico and Brazil.
CADE also approved the acquisition of America Latina Logistica by Rumo Logistica
Operadora Multimodal, subject to behavioral commitments.' 3 This transaction raised
concerns due to the potential to stimulate market foreclosure and encourage
discrimination.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In March, CADE and the Federal Prosecutor's Office signed a Leniency Agreement
with Setal Engenharia e Construy6es, SOG Oleo e Gas, and individuals from "Operayio
Lava Jato" (Operation Car Wash).' 4 Operation Car Wash involved public bidding for
Petrobras' onshore industrial assembly construction and was Brazil's largest ever
9. Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos de Concorrancia, Consumo e Com6rcio Internacional (IBRAC),
Overview of Competition Law in Brazil 31 (Cristianne Zarzur, Krisztian Katona & Mariana Villela eds., 2015).
10. Resoluqio No. 12, de 11 de Marco de 2015, DiARIo OFICIAL DA UNLo [D.O.U] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.),
http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/RESOLUC3%87%C3%830%20NC2%BA%2012.pdf.
11. Resoluqdo No. 14, de 14 de Outubro de 2015, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U] de 21.10.2015
(Braz.), http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/CADE%20-%2OResoluC3%A7%C3%A3o%2014-2015%20
(002).pdf.
12. Ato de Concentragio No. 08700.004185/2014-50, de 29 de Janeiro de 2015, DIARro OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 4.2.2015 (Braz.).
13. Ato de Concentraqdo No. 08700.005719/2014-65, de 11 de Fevererio, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.).
14. CONSELHo ADMINISTRIVO DE DEFENSA ECONOMICA (CADE), Newsletter No. 26 (Mar. 2015), http:/
/www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?cd6lbl47de34c84adc6afd55e36c.
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corruption case. In July, following the execution of a Leniency Agreement, CADE began
investigating an alleged cartel in the foreign exchange market."
D. DOMINANCE
In July, CADE convicted Eli Lilly for the practice of sham litigation, imposing a fine of
BRL 36.6 million.1 6 In CADE's view, Eli Lilly artificially obtained a monopoly over a
medicine by filing numerous court actions in multiple jurisdictions while presenting
misleading information and omitting important data from the judges.
E. COURT DECISIONS
In 2013, CADE fined SKF for setting minimum resale price restrictions for distributors
in Brazil. SKF appealed. In May, after SKF's appeal, the Federal Court decided that
CADE's decision had violated SKF's right to legal certainty, since CADE changed the




In 2015, a controversial billis that would have authorized the Commissioner of
Competition (Commissioner) to investigate United States-Canada price gaps did not
pass. 19
The Competition Bureau (Bureau) released new guidelines regarding electronic
production,2 0 corporate compliance programs,2 1 and its approach to outreach,
enforcement and advocacy. 22
15. Processo Administrativo No. 08700.004633/2015-04, de 2 de Julho de 2015, DIARIo OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 14.8.2015 (Braz.).
16. Processo Administrativo No. 08012.011508/2007-91, de 24 de Junho de 2015 DiARIo OFICIAL DA
UNIAo [D.O.U.] de 30.6.2015 (Braz.).
17. Daniel 0. Andreoli & Vivian Fraga, Resale Price Maintenance in Brazil: CADE's Understanding After the
SKF Case, MONOPOLY MATTERS, (ABA Section of Antitrust Law/Unilateral Conduct Comm., Chicago, I.L.),
Spring 2016, at 19, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antrust law/at322 100 news
letter_2016spring.authcheckdam.pdf.
18. Price Transparency Act, Bill C-49, 2nd Sess., 41st Parl. (2014) (Can.).
19. Id.
20. See COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA (CCB), Enforcement Guidelines: Production of Electronically Stored
Information (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-ef-e-
production-e.pdf/$FILE/cb-ef-e-producdon-e.pdf.
21. CCB, Bulletin: Corporate Compliance Programs (June 3, 2015), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/
site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-bulletin-corp-compliance-e.pdf/$FILE/cb-bulletin-corp-compliance-e.pdf




PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTITRUST 49
B. MERGERS
The Bureau permitted magazine 23 and newspaper24 transactions without remedies,
citing "competitive pressures from digital alternatives,"25 but treated French-language
"brick and mortar" and online book sales separately. 26 In a merger involving a joint
acquisition by two of Canada's largest telecoms, the Bureau required a confidentiality
protocol.27 Concerning Holcim/Lafarge, the Bureau required the divestiture of Holcim's
Canadian operations. 28
The Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) prohibited the closing of a gas station transaction
in six markets,29 although the Bureau had requested interim relief in fourteen.30
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
P6troles Global was fined CAD one million for retail gasoline price fixing in a contested
proceeding; 3 an individual was sentenced for bid rigging; 32 and a jury acquitted all
accused in another significant bid rigging matter.3 3 In the (ultimately stayed) Chocolate
proceedings, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (SCJ) ruled that facts proffered to the
Bureau by immunity and leniency applicants were not privileged.34
D. DOMINANCE
The Tribunal permitted continuation of the abuse of dominance application against
Direct Energy, which had exited the relevant water heaters market.3 5
23. Press Release, CCB, Competition Bureau Clears TVA Group's Acquisition of Transcontinental's
Magazines (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03876.html.
24. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding the Proposed Acquisition by
Postmedia Network Inc. of the English-Language Newspapers of Quebecor Media Inc. (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.compedtionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03899.html.
25. Id.
26. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding the Acquisition by Renaud-Bray
of Archambault Retail Stores (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.compettionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
03988.html.
27. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding BCE and Rogers' Acquisition of
GLENTEL (May 14, 2015), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03924.html.
28. Position Statement, CCB, Competition Bureau Statement Regarding the Proposed Acquisition by
Holcim of Lafarge (May 4, 2015), http://www.compettionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03920.html.
29. Commissioner of Competition v. Parkland Industries Ltd., 2015 Comp. Trib. 4, para. 121 (Can.).
30. Press Release, CCB, Competition Bureau Challenges a Merger Between Gas Retailers Parkland and
Pioneer (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.compettionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03917.html.
31. R. c. Les P6troles Global Inc., 2015 QCCS 1618, para. 2 (Can. Que.).
32. Press Release, CCB, Ontario Individual Sentenced After Pleading Guilty to Bid-Rigging (May 21,
2015), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03936.html.
33. Press Release, CCB, Competition Bureau to Consider Not-Guilty Verdicts in Major Bid-Rigging Case
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.compettionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03912.html.
34. R. v. Nestle Canada Inc., 2015 ONSC 810, para. 79 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
35. Commissioner of Competinon v. Direct Energy Markenng Ltd., 2015 Comp. Trib. 2, para. 54, 56
(Can.).
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E. COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commissioner had not properly quantified
anticompetitive merger effects under the efficiencies defense.36
In class actions, air cargo was certified,3 7 but the SCJ refused jurisdiction over absent
foreign claimants,8 in lithium ion batteries, the SCJ refused jurisdiction over two
defendants,39 but certified the action against those remaining; 40 in LCD panels, the SCJ




In 2015, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) published the
"Provisions on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or
Restrict Competition" (Regulation).43 The Regulation is the first set of comprehensive
rules dedicated to the intersection of antitrust and IP laws in China. The Regulation
provides some safe harbors, a rule of reason analysis, and details on the application of the
law to IP.
B. MERGERS
In Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
(MOFCOM) required that Nokia observe its FRAND44 commitments for both Nokia's
and Alcatel-Lucent's standard-essential patents (SEPs) rather than seek injunction or
exclusion orders.45 MOFCOM also required that Nokia notify licensees in China of any
of its future transfer of SEPs. MOFCOM changed conditions previously imposed in three
cases-Google/Motorola, Western Digital/Hitachi, and Seagate/Samsung-after review of
alleged changes in circumstances and/or market conditions. 4 6
36. Tervita Corp. v. Commissioner of Competition, 2015 SCC 3, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 161, 163 (Can.).
37. Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada, 2015 ONSC 5352, para. 144 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
38. Id. at para. 205.
39. Shah v. LG Chem, Ltd., 2015 ONSC 2628, para. 1, 4, 6 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.).
40. Shah v. LG Chem, Ltd. 2015 ONSC 6148, para. 9-11 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
41. Fanshawe College v. AU Optronics Corp., 2015 ONSC 2046, para. 99, 115 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
42. Fanshawe College v. AU Optronics Corp., 2015 ONSC 3414, para. 34 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
43. SAICs New IPR Regulation to Take Effect on 1 August 2015, MAYER BROWNJSM (June 11, 2015) https://
www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/lddl 3cef-3598-4127-ad9O-3 807a96el 7a6/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/b7aeed69-50a 1-45ef-8f77-3b8ee1blfd00/1 5061 1-HKGPRC-AntitrustCompetition-IP-TMT.
pdf.
44. FRAND stands for "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory." See, e.g., What is "FRAND"?,
MOBILEBURN, http://www.globalizationlOl.org/what-is-globalization/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
45. News Release, MOFCOM, MOFCOM Approves Nokia's Acquisition of Equity of Alcatel-Lucent
Conditionally (Oct. 21, 2015), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201510/
20151001151049.shtml.
46. See Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 2 of2015, MOFCOM (Jan. 9, 2015, 3:42 PM), http://fldj.
mofcom.gov.cn/arcle/ztxx/201501/20150100862331.shtml; Ministy of Commerce Announcement No. 41 of
2015, MOFCOM (Oct. 10, 2015, 9:25 AM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztx/201510/20151001139040.
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MOFCOM published four penalty decisions for improperly notified transactions. Fines
were imposed but the transactions were not reversed. Two involved non-filing for joint
ventures and two involved two-step acquisitions with an initial acquisition of thirty-five
percent of the target's shares, which was considered to be "gun-jumping" even if the
parties filed notifications for the overall transactions.4 7
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
NDRC and SAIC investigated and issued large fines in high-profile cases, including (1)
an RMB six billion (USD 940 million) fine against Qualcomm for setting unfairly high
royalties for wireless SEPs, tying sales of non-wireless SEPs, and imposing unfair
conditions on sales of baseband chips; 48 and (2) a fine of RMB 350 million (USD fifty-five
million) on Mercedes-Benz, as well as a fine of RMB 120 million (USD nineteen million)
on Nissan and their respective dealers for minimum resale price maintenance. 49
Moreover, NDRC cracked down on several administrative monopolies including
conduct by local governmental authorities requiring exclusive dealing with designated
companies, discriminating against non-local companies, and restricting participation by
non-local companies.
D. COURT DECISIONS
In February, the Intermediate People's Court of Guangdong Province found that the
Department of Education of Guangdong Province abused its administrative power by
designating a software developed by a company called Glodon as the software to be used
in its National Vocational Students Skills Competition. 0
In June, the Beijing High People's Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Beijing
Intellectual Property Court over antitrust civil litigation between an individual and
Carrefour and Abbott." This may be the first follow-on antitrust civil litigation after a
finding of violation by the AML enforcement agencies. The case has yet to be tried.
shtml; Ministry of Commerce Notice No. 43 of 2015, MOFCOM (Oct. 19, 2015, 1:16 PM), http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/artcle/ztxxl/201510/20151001144105.shtml.
47. See Commercial Letter No. 669, MOFCOM (Sept. 29, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
article/ztx/201509/20150901124896.shtml; Commercial Letter No. 668, MOFCOM (Sept. 29, 2015, 2:38
PM), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/ardcle/ztxx/201509/20150901124887.shtml.
48. National Development and Reform Commission Administrative Penalty Decision No. 2015 [1], NAT'L DEV. &
REFORM COMM'N http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201503/t20150302_666170.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
49. Mercedes Was Fined 350 Million Yuan due to Price Fixing Car Prices Antitrust Sledgehammer Down Again,
CHINA NEWS NETWORK, (Apr. 23, 2015, 9:49 AM), http://www.chinanews.com/auto/2015/04-23/
7228159.shtml; Nissan in Guangdong Province, The Implementation of Price Fixing to be Punished, BUREAU OF
PRICE MONITORING (Sept. 10, 2015), http://210.76.65.10:9000/pub/gdsfgw2014/zwgk/gzdt/gzyw/201509/
t20150910_328993.html.
50. China' First Since "People Suing Government Officials"Anti-Monopoly Litigation Administrative Proceedings,
CHINA YOUTH DAILY, (May 29, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-05/29/
c127854577.htm.
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V. European Union
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The European Commission's (EC) new Competition Commissioner, Margrethe
Vestager, launched a public consultation on boosting European Union (EU) national
competition authorities' powers,5 2 and is considering proposals to extend the merger
notification system to minority shareholdings.5 3
B. MERGERS
The EC opened investigations into Hutchinson's planned acquisition of Telefonica UK
and Liberty Global's proposed takeover of BASE Belgium. The EC cleared Orange's
acquisition of Spain-focused Jazztel upon securing remedies. Telenor and TeliaSonera
abandoned their Danish merger plans after failed remedies discussions.
After in-depth examination and with remedies, the EC cleared General Electric's
acquisition of Alstom's energy business, a deal that attracted significant political
attention. 4
C. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The EC issued five cartel decisions in 2015, imposing fines totaling EUR 365 million
(approximately USD 407 million), lower than the more than EUR one billion annual
totals reached in the past three years." In the digital space, the EC issued formal charges
against Sky and six other film studios, alleging that they respectively prevented Sky from
supplying pay-TV content to viewers located outside the UK and Ireland.56 As part of the
Digital Single Market strategy, the EC commenced a sector-wide inquiry into e-
commerce, sending questionnaires to multiple companies to identify potential
anticompetitive barriers to the online trade and supply of digital content across the EU. 7
52. Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission consults on boosting enforcement powers of
national competition authorities (Nov. 4, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-5998_en.htm.
53. Margrethe Vestager, Competition Comm'n, European Comm'n, Keynote Address at
Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht: Thoughts on Merger Reform and Market Definition (Mar. 12, 2015).
54. Press Release, European Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Clears GE's Acquisition of Alstom's Power
Generation and Transmission Assets, Subject to Conditions (Sept. 8, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release IP-15-5606 en.htm.
55. Cartels Cases, EUROPEAN COMM'N COMPETITION, http://ec.europa.eu/compeddon/cartels/cases/
cases.html (last updated Apr. 3, 2016).
56. Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections on Cross-
Border Provision of Pay-TV Services Available in UK and Ireland (July 23, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-releaseIP-15-5432_en.htm.
57. Press Release European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Launches E-Commerce Sector Inquiry (May
6, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP- 15-492 1_en.htm.
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D. DOMINANCE
The EC adopted formal charges against Google for favoring its internet comparison
shopping products.5 8 The EC sent charges to Gazprom in another "political-heavy"
investigation involving territorial restrictions in supply agreements. 59
E. COURT DECISIONS
In Dole Food Company, Inc. v. European Commission, the EU Court of Justice (CJEU)
confirmed that the pure exchange of forward-looking strategic information among rivals
equates to a cartel. 6 0 In InnoLux Corp. v. European Commission, the CJEU confirmed that
the EC may impose fines based on foreign sales of cartelized components that were
transformed into finished products, within the same corporate group, and sold in the
EU.61
In Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., the CJEU provided guidance on a standard
essential patent holder's ability to seek an injunction against an infringer without violating
EU antitrust law. 62
VI. France
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Macron Law came into force, introducing settlement procedures for companies
engaged in anticompetitive practices. Companies who agree to refrain from challenging
the Authorit6 de la Concurrence's (FCA) objections will be informed of the potential
range of fines when applying for settlement.6 3 With respect to leniency, the FCA may
now forgive a penalty without a prior written report.
The Macron Law also introduced a "stop the clock" mechanism in Phase One of
merger control that allows the FCA to extend the review period up to sixty business
days. 64 The FCA may extend the duration of Phase Two if commitments are proposed in
extremis or if requested information is not provided in time.
58. Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on
Comparison Shopping Service (Apr. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-15-
4781 en.htm.
59. Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Gazprom
for Alleged Abuse of Dominance on Central and Eastern European Gas Supply Markets (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-4828_en.htm.
60. Case C-286/13P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm'n, 2015 E.C.R. 1-184.
61. Case C-231/14P, InnoLux Corp. v. Comm'n, 2015 E.C.R. 1-451.
62. Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 1-477.




PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
54 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
B. MERGERS
In May, the FCA applied the "fix it first" principle for the first time while clearing the
acquisition of Totalgaz by UGI France, the parent company of Antargaz. 65 UGI must
identify an acquirer for the divestiture assets prior to the adoption of the decision.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In May, the FCA imposed moderate fines of EUR 15.2 million on poultry
manufacturers for concerted practices that reduced uncertainty in their trade
negotiations. 66 The collective commitment to establish an inter-branch organization is
likely to be more effective than fines calculated according to the usual method.
D. DOMINANCE
The FCA, together with the EC, Italian, and Swedish authorities, investigated "price
parity" clauses in agreements between Booking.com and hotels, which required hotels to
offer the same or better prices on Booking.com's platform as offered on other distribution
platforms or directly to clients. The case was closed following a five-year commitment to
refrain from the practice. 67
In September, the FCA rejected a request for interim measures relating to the
suspension of the AdWords account of an editor of weather forecasting websites by
Google, which is dominant in online search advertising.68 The FCA process continued on




There were no new legislative amendments in 2015. The transposition of the EU
directive by December 2016 will require changes to rules applicable to private damages
claims, including the statutes of limitation, joint and several liability, and passing on
defense.69
65. Press Release, Autorit6 de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], Acquisition of Totalgaz by UGI
(Antargaz) (May 18, 2015), http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id-rub=607&id-
article=2555.
66. Press Release, Autorite de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], Concerted Practices in the Sector
for the Sale of Poultry Meat (Chicken, Turkey, Duck, Rabbit, Etc.) (May 6, 2015), http://
www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?idrub=607&idarticle=2626.
67. Press Release, Autorit6 de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], Online Hotel Booking Sector
(Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id rub=607&idarticle=2535.
68. Press Release, Autorit6 de la Concurrence [Competition Authority], Online Advertising (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id-rub=607&id-article=2637.
69. Directive 2014/104, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain
Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law
Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 2014 OJ. (L 349), 1.
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B. MERGERS
The FCO continued its active review of transactions, although only seven Phase Two
investigations were opened in 2015, fewer than in previous years. One was withdrawn
(furniture retailing), one cleared subject to conditions (car parts), two remain pending, and
the rest were unconditionally cleared. The sole prohibition decision in 2015 concerned
the proposed supermarket merger between Edeka and Tengelmann.70
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Besides classic cartel enforcement, the Bundeskartellamt (FCO) seems focused on
vertical restraints and the use of most-favored nation (MFN) clauses on internet
platforms. The FCO also imposed fines exceeding EUR 150 million on companies in
various product categories in the food retail sector, including sweets, coffee, beer, personal
car, and pet food for resale price maintenance. 71 Other fines included certain car parts
(EUR seventy-five million), as well as resale price maintenance by mattress suppliers and
suppliers of portable navigation devices.
The FCO also concluded that a prohibition to resell ASICS products on price
comparison tools or internet platforms was illegal. 72 In Booking.com, the FCO confirmed
its earlier HRS decision and found that MFN clauses requiring a hotel provider to offer its
rooms at the best price on those platforms were illegal.73
D. DOMINANCE
The FCO pursued a limited number of abuse of dominance cases. Most prominently, it
found that Deutsche Post AG had exposed suppliers of wholesale mailing services to a
margin squeeze and engaged in exclusive dealing.7 4
E. JUDGMENTS
In February 2015, the Higher Regional Court in Diisseldorf confirmed the dismissal of
an action by Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) for damages relating to the German cement
cartel case, because the court considered the assignment of the claims by the purchasers of
70. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office], Bundeskartellamt prohibits takeover
of Kaiser's Tengelmann by EDEKA (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/
EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/01_04_2015_EdekaUntersagung.html.
71. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office], Vertical Resale Price Maintenance in the Food
Retail Sector - Majority of Fine Proceedings Concluded (June 18, 2015), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/18_06_2015 Vertkalfall.html.
72. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office], Unlawful Restriction of Online Sales of
ASICS Running Shoes (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Press
emitteilungen/2015/27_08_2015_ASICS.html.
73. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office], Bundeskartellamt Issues Statement of
Objections Regarding Booking.com's 'Best Price' Clauses (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/02_04_2015_Booking.html.
74. Press Release, Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office], Deutsche Post AG Abuses Dominant Position
in Tariffs for Bulk Mail Customers (July 7, 2015), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/
EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/07_07_2015_Post.html.
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the cement to CDC to be invalid.75 The judgment is final and marks an unceremonious
end to a trailblazing case that had been pending since 2002. The CDC has since
announced that it has re-launched an action concerning at least some damages claims.76
In a December 2014 judgment that was published in 2015, the Federal Supreme Court
re-confirmed its prior findings that antitrust liability has to be assessed based on the acts
of individuals and attributed to specific entities for which these individuals acted.
Following, for example, a merger, the new entity is not necessarily liable for antitrust fines
except in specific circumstances. 7 7 This has already led to legislative amendments in order
to ensure that legal successors inherit such liabilities.
VIII. India
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) amended its merger regulations to
simplify procedural requirements, ease the filing process, and extend the deadlines for
decisions.78 The amendments also provide guidance notes on requirements of the short
filing form (Form-I).79
B. CARTELS AND OTHER AGREEMENTS
Penalties were imposed on four government-owned general insurance companies for
bid rigging in a tender floated by the State of Kerala.80 The transport sector also came
under scrutiny as price-fixing penalties were imposed on a cooperative union of truck
operators in Punjab.1 The maximum penalty of 10 percent of the turnover was also
imposed on the trade association for road transport service providers, All India Motor
Transport Congress, for a coordinated hike in freight charges. 82
75. Press Release, Cartel Damage Claims, Higher Regional Court Dismisses Appeal in German Cement
Cartel Case (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
Cement-press-Release-4.pdf.
76. Press Release, Cartel Damage Claims, CDC Cartel Damage Claims Files New Action for Damages
Against HeidelbergCement AG (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/Press-Release-Cement-II-151029.pdf.
77. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court ofJustice] Dec. 16, 2014, KARTELLBUGELDSACHE [KRB]
47, 2013 (Ger.).
78. Shreeja Sen, CCI amends merger regulations to increase ease of doing business, LIvEMIrNT (July 3, 2015,
11:27 PM), http://www.livemint.com/Politics/fSQpGeOHP2ilHP9wmLTjsN/CCI-amends-merger-regula
tions-to-increase-ease-of-doing-busi.html.
79. Karan Singh Chandhiok, CCI Amends Combination Regulations, THE FIRM (July 7, 2015, 9:13 AM),
http://thefirm.moneycontrol.com/story-page.php?autono=1829801.
80. Competition Comm'n of India Suo Moto Case No. 02 of 2014, 2 (2014), available at http://
www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/022014S.pdf.
81. Competition Comm'n of India Case No. 43 of 2013, 6 (2013), available at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/
default/files/432013_0.pdf.
82. Competition Comm'n of India Case No. 61 of 2012, 24 (2012), availahle at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/
default/files/61-2012_0.pdf.
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CCI has also shown an increasing inclination to penalize individuals responsible for
violations. 3
C. MERGERS
CCI imposed structural remedies in two mergers: the acquisition of Ranbaxy
Laboratories by Sun Pharmaceuticals subject to divestment of the overlapping brands in
seven markets8 4 and the merger of Holcim Limited and Lafarge SA, wherein Lafarge was
required to sell two cement plants to prevent "unilateral" and "coordinated" effects.85
D. DOMINANCE
CCI's investigation arm (Director General) concluded that Google abused its dominant
position in relation to its search and AdWord services. 86 Google will have an opportunity
to challenge the Director General's report before CCI passes its final order in the case.
E. COURT DECISIONS
The Delhi High Court held that CCI has the power to review and recall its order to the
Director General to investigate a matter.87 The Madras High Court clarified that the
Director General cannot initiate investigations on its own, and must seek CCI's
permission before widening an investigation's scope.88 Further, it held that in such cases,
CCI is not required to form an entirely new opinion before directing the Director
General to investigate. 89
COMPAT set aside a penalty on Thomas Cook for "gun-jumping," finding that the
mere fact that several transactions were entered into around the same time and were
approved by the board on the same date was insufficient to establish that they were
interconnected. 9 0
COMPAT also set aside the penalty imposed by CCI on the Board of Control for
Cricket in India stating that the information relied on lacked evidentiary value.91
83. See Competition Comm'n of India Case No. 45 of 2012, 28 (2012), available at http://www.cci.gov.in/
sites/default/files/06201245_0.pdf; Competition Comm'n of India Case No. 26 of 2013, 31 (2013), available
at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/262013_0.pdf.
84. Competition Comm'n of India, Combination Registration No. C-2014/05/170 (Mar. 17, 2015),
available at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/C-2014-05-170A_0.pdf.
85. Competition Comm'n of India, Combination Registration No. C-2014/07/190 (Mar. 30, 2015),
available at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/C-2014-07-190_0.pdf.
86. Kian Ganz, Why did CCI write Google a bad report card?, LIvEMWr (Sept. 16, 2015, 7:53 AM), http://
www.livemint.com/Companies/5D4c8f9kKB4llyL99Rfm4H/Why-did-CCI-write-Google-a-bad-report-
card.html.
87. Google Inc. v. Competition Comm'n of India, (2015) H.CJ. Delhi 22 (India), available at https://
indiankanoon.org/doc/190415917/.
88. Hyundai Motor India Ltd. v. Competition Comm'n of India, (2015) H.CJ Madras 23 (India), available
at http://judis.nic.in/judischennai/judgeResultDisp.asp?MyChk=210496.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Thomas Cook Ltd. v. Competition Comm'n of India, Appeal No. 48 of 2014, C.A.T. 41 (India),
available at http://compat.nic.in/upload/PDFs/udgement-orders-2015/26.08.2015.pdf.
91. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Competition Comm'n of India, Appeal No. 17 of 2013, C.A.T. 46
(India), available at http://compat.nic.in/upload/PDFs/feb-judgement-orders-2015/BCCI%2019.2.pdf.
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IX. Israel
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In March, the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) published proposed amendments to the
Restrictive Trade Practices Law (the Law) with respect to the Merger Control Regime to
amend: the definition of "Company" to include various types of foreign corporations and
entities; the definition of "Merger of Companies" to include mergers with an individual;
and filing thresholds to include, inter alia, foreign corporations that have no sales in Israel
under certain circumstances. 92 The Law also proposes to prohibit anticompetitive
mergers below the filing thresholds and extend the timeline for reviewing mergers to 150
days. 93
In July, the IAA published proposed amendments to the Law concerning the Israeli
Monopoly Regime to make it apply to entities that possess market power, rather than just
to an "an entity that possesses a market share of more than half of the total supply or
acquisition of an asset, or more than half of the total provision or acquisition of a
service." 94
The IAA also proposed amendments to impose limitations on official importers in Israel
by, inter alia, prohibiting an official importer from abusing its position in the market, even
if not considered to be a monopoly.95
B. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In August, the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) ruled on the District Court's verdict and
sentence against Shufersal (the largest supermarket chain in Israel) and certain former
executives. 96 The ISC found that the company's officers attempted to stop suppliers from
extending special offers to a competing supermarket chain. 97 When this attempt did not
succeed, Shufersal attempted "to punish" a number of suppliers by removing some of their
products from shelves.98 The ISC held that this conduct was an attempt to establish a
restrictive arrangement and violated merger conditions stipulated by the General Director
when he consented to a merger between Shufersal and another chain.9 9 The ruling set
two important precedents: for the first time in Israel, jail sentences were ordered for
violating merger conditions and for attempting to set a vertical restrictive arrangement;
92. Hagai Doron, New legislative amendments proposed by the Israel Antitrust Authority: merger control reform
and protection ofcompetition from parallel imports, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=7a91el0f-0272-4059-a8ed-flf6a9d8329f.
93. Id.
94. David Gilo, Irael: Antitrust Authority, GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEw (2016), http://
globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/72/sections/253/chapters/2928/israel-antitrust-authority/.
95. The Israeli Antitrust Authority Proposes a Reform of the Merger Control Regime, FBC & Co. (May 2015),
http://www.fbclawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Israeli-Competition-Law---Potential-Merger-
Reform.pdf.
96. Talya Solomon & Iris Achmon, Sigh ofRelief Israeli Supreme Court Finally Moves Toward Rule ofReason
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and, as a rule, vertical arrangements will be examined primarily on the basis of their
likelihood to harm competition.
C. DOMINANCE
In June, the Antitrust Tribunal rejected the appeal of a declaration that El Al held a
monopoly in aviation security services.' 00 The declaration was based on concerns that El
Al would refuse to provide services to other airline competitors.' 0' The Tribunal rejected
El Al's claims that the service was "public" (which it was forced to provide) and not
"commercial" in character.1 02
In Unipharm v. Sanofi, Unipharm accused Sanofi of defrauding the Israel Patents
Registrar by providing inadequate disclosure in a second application for a patent. 0 3 Due
to the monopoly position granted to Sanofi by Israeli patent laws, the Central District
Court held, inter alia, that this was an abuse of Sanofi's dominant position and that
misleading the Patents Registrar, intentionally or due to gross negligence, may be
considered to be an abuse of monopoly power. 0 4
X. Mexico
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 2015, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (Cofece) released guidelines
relating to relative monopolistic practices investigations and illegal concentrations,
monopolistic practices investigations, leniency programs, and merger control.10 In
addition, draft guidelines were released on information exchange. 06
Cofece also issued Technical Criteria 07 for the Quantitative Index to Measure Market
Concentration and released drafts of Technical Criteria that cover requests to dismiss a
criminal action and requests and issuances of precautionary measures and the
determination of pledges. 08




103. Talya Solomon & Karen Elburg, Client update - antitrust and patent rights - "winter is coming"for patent
owners, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=B752b88c-a3f2-48c7-
Sdfb-1799c2370666.
104. Id.
105. COFECE Publishes New Monopolistic Practices Guidelines, COFECE (July 3, 2015), https://
www.cofece.mix/cofece/i ngles/i ndex.php/prensa/historico-de-noticias/cofece-publishes-new-monopolistic-
practices-guidelines.
106. COFECE consults on guidance on regulation of information exchange, PRACTICAL LAw (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://us.practicallaw.com/0-619-9283.
107. Technical Criteria are binding for Cofece, Guidelines are not. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION
ANTITRUST COMMITTEE, COMMENTS ON THE COMISION FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONOMICA
DRAFT MERGER CONTROL GUIDELINES 3-4 (June 5, 2015), available at http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/
AntitrustTradeLawSection/Antrust/Projects.aspx.
108. Galicia Abogados, Mexico: Puhlication By The Mexican Federal Economic Competition Commission Of The
Technical Criteria For The Estimation And Application OfA Quantitative Index To Measure Market Concentration,
MONDAQ (July 3, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com/mexico/x/409474/Antitrust+Competidon/Publication+
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B. MERGERS
Cofece authorized a transaction between Nissan and Daimler; the acquisition of
Pilgrim's Pride by Tyson; and the acquisition of Alstom's Power & Grid business by
GE.109
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Cofece conducted investigations of cartel conduct in the CRT (which eventually closed)
and in passenger ground transportation in Chiapas (which resulted in sanctions of
approximately USD 1.8 million for price fixing).11 0 There are currently nine ongoing
investigations in several different markets.
D. DOMINANCE
Cofece conducted eleven investigations for abuse of dominance, but imposed only one
sanction against Telcel, a company that provides interconnection services for mobile
phones."' There are three ongoing abuse of dominance investigations into the industrial
gases market, access to federal zones and parking at the Mexico City Airport for the
provision of public transportation services, and the credit information market.
XI. Russia
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In October, Federal Law No. 135-FZ, "On Protection of Competition" was
amended1 2 to increase transparency around investigations in order to increase the validity
of decisions made by FAS Russia.
B. MERGERS
If certain thresholds are met, companies must obtain preliminary consent for a merger
from FAS Russia before the transaction can close." 3 The amendments allow entities to
By+The+Mexican+Federal+Economic+Competition+Commission+Of+The+Technical+Criteria+For+The+
Esfmation+And+Applicadon+Of+A+Quantitadve+lndex+To+Measure+Market+Concentration.
109. Resoluci6n Expediente CNT-099-2014 [Decision CNT-099-2014] Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
[DO], 19 de Febrero de 2015 (Mex.); Resoluci6n Expediente CNT-088-2014 [Decision CNT-088-2014],
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 20 de Mayo de 2015 (Mex.); Resoluci6n Expediente CNT-081-2015
[Decision CNT-081-2015], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 10 de Septiembre de 2015 (Mex.).
110. Expediente Numero 10-001-2009 [Case Number 10-001-2009] Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO],
9 de Octubre de 2015 (Mex.); Resoluci6n Expediente 10-004-2012 [Decision 10-004-2012] Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [DO], 25 de Junio de 2015 (Mex.).
111. Expediente Numero DE-037-2006 [Case Number DE-037-2006] Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
[DO], 29 de Noviembre de 2006 (Mex.).
112. Laura Brank et al., Fourth Antimonopoly Package: Impact on M&A and ]oint Ventures in Russia, JDSUPRA
(Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fourth-antimonopoly-package-impact-on-m-64106/.
113. Id.
VOL. 50
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTITRUST 61
electronically file information on proposed transactions before the official submission of
the relevant application or notifications.'1 4
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Cartel enforcement has been declared to be a top enforcement priority of FAS
Russia."' Given the widespread practice of conducting tenders in various sectors of the
Russian economy, cartel enforcement is focused around a large number of bid-rigging
cases.
In a change to its investigation procedures, FAS Russia requested information from
external experts and obtained market analyses while investigating the Russian agents of
one of the largest ocean-going container carriers for potential cartel conduct." 6
D. DOMINANCE
The amendments to Federal Law No. 135-FZ now provide that for a company to be
dominant, its market share must exceed thirty-five percent, subject to certain
exceptions." 7 The amendments abolished the requirement for subsequent notification of
transactions if one of the companies involved in the transaction is listed in the official
Register of Companies with a market share exceeding thirty-five percent of the relevant
product market. The amendments also give the Russian Government the right to
determine non-discrimination rules in highly concentrated markets." 8
In 2015, FAS Russia found that Google had abused its dominant position by requiring
vendors of mobile phones to pre-install Google applications on mobile phones.11 9 It
ordered Google to adjust its contracts to remove the anticompetitive clauses.1 20
114. Id.
115. Evgeny Khokhlov, Russia: cartel investigations, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONs REVIEw (July 23, 2015), http:/
/globalinvestigationsreview.com/i nsight/the-european-miiddle-eastern-and-african-investigations-review-
2015/1024330/russia-cartel-investigations.
116. Svilen Petrov, Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia sentenced five container carriers, MARITIME NEWS
(Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.newsmaritime.com/2016/federal-antimonopoly-service-of-russia-sentenced-five-
container-carriers/
117. Brank, spra note 112.
118. Id.
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XII. South Africa
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There were no legislative changes in 2015, but the Commission developed guidelines
on administrative penalties,121 issued draft guidelines on public interest issues in
mergers,1 22 and is developing guidelines on information exchange.1 23
B. MERGERS
The Commission recommended the prohibition of a RAN-sharing arrangement
between MTN and Telkom Mobile.124
The Commission recommended the approval of Vodacom's acquisition of Neotel on
the condition that Vodacom does not make use of Neotel's spectrum for a two-year
period,1 25 but this deal is facing significant opposition, as some argue Vodacom's access to
Neotel's spectrum will enhance its dominance.1 2 6
To mitigate negative public interest impacts from mergers, the authorities imposed
conditions on mergers including moratoria on retrenchments;1 27 requirements to invest
and operate in South Africa;1 28 and requirements to source from local suppliers.1 29
121. Guidelines for the Determination of Administrative Penalties for Prohibited Practices, COMPETITION
COMM'N S. AFR. (May 1, 2015), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Final-
Guidelines-for-Determination-of-Admin-Penales-MAY-2015.pdf.
122. Guidelines on the assessment ofpublic interest provisions in merger regulation under the Competition Act No. 89
of 1998 (as amended), COMPETITION COMM'N S. AFR. (Tan. 23, 2015), available at http://
www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Final-Public-Interest-Guidelines-public-version-210115.
pdf.
123. COMPETITION COMM'N S. AFR., 2014/15 ANNuAL REPORT, available at http://www.compcom.co.za/
wp-content/uploads/2014/09/COMPETITION-COIMISSION-ANNUAL-REPORT-2015.pdf.
124. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Commission recommends prohibition of MTN and
Telkom RAN sharing and bi-lateral roaming merger (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Commission-recommends-prohibidon-of-MTN-and-Telkom-RAN-sharing-and-
bi-lateral-roaming-mergerl.pdf.
125. The matter is being heard by the Tribunal from 23 November 2015 to 11 December 2015. See
COMPETITION COMM'N S. AFR., MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS' REPORT 170 (Tune 30, 2015), availahle at
http://www.comptrib.co.za/publicadons/case-documents/large-merger-vodacom-proprietary-limiited-neotel-
proprietary-limited/.
126. See Franny Rabkin, Icasa Prompted by Law in Approving Vodacom-Neotel License Transfer, BDLIvE (Nov.
13, 2015, 5:47 AM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/technology/2015/11/13/icasa-prompted-by-law-in-
approving-vodacom-neotel-licences-transfer.
127. Reasons for Decision, In the matter between Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union and The
Competition Commission, Newco One, Bagshaw Footwear (Pty) Ltd, Bolton Footwear (Pty) Ltd, Kap Manufacturing
(Pty) Ltd, The Divisions, United Farm, Wayne Plastics, Mossop Western Leathers, ]ordan Shoes, Competition
Tribunal S. Afr. (May 28, 2015), No. IMI61Decl4/020321; Reasons for Decision, In the matter between Clover
SA (Pty) Ltd and Nkunzi Milkway (Pty) Ltd, Competition Tribunal S. Mr. (May 27, 2015), No. IMI75Decl4/
020461; Reasons for Decision, In the matter between Fidelity Cash Solutions (Pty) Ltd, Fidelity Security Services
(Pty) Ltd, Protea Coin Group (Pty) Ltd and The Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal S. Afr. (May 27,
2015), No. IMl83Janl5/020545.
128. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Commission Approves Steel Merger with Conditions




PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTITRUST 63
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Commission conducted more dawn raids in the last two years than in all prior
years, including on the premises of the suppliers of liquid petroleum gas cylinders,130
furniture removal companies,131 recruitment advertising agencies,1 32 and fire protection
system providers.1 33
The Commission has been active in conducting and initiating market enquiries. It
extended the period for completion of the Healthcare Enquiry;1 34 called for more
submissions in the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Enquiry;13 and released final terms of
reference for the Retail Grocery Market Enquiry.1 36
D. DOMINANCE
The Commission experienced mixed outcomes in dominance matters. Its successful
prosecution of Sasol Polymers was overturned by the Competition Appeal Court
(CAC).137 The Commission is asking the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal on the
basis that excessive pricing has substantial public interest impacts that should be assessed
by that Court. 3 8 The Commission also lost its long-running case against South African
Breweries (SAB), with the CAC finding that SAB and its appointed distributors had not
engaged in price discrimination.1 39
130. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Competition Commission Raids Offices of Liquefied
Petroleum Gas Suppliers (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/
Competition-Commission-raids-offices-of-LPG-suppliers.pdf
131. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Competition Commission Raids Furniture Removal
Companies for the Second Time (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/
Competition-Commission-raids-furniture-removal-companies-for-the-second-time.pdf
132. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Competition Commission Raids Offices of Three
Recruitment Advertising Agencies in Gauteng (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/
uploads/2015/01/Competiton-Commission-raids-offices-of-three-recruitment-adversing-agencies.pdf
133. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Competition Commission Raids Offices of Six Suppliers
of Fire Control and Protection Systems in Gauteng (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/
uploads/2015/01/Commission-raids-offices-of-five-suppliers-of-fire-protection-systems-in-Gauteng.pdf
134. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Competition Commission Amends Terms of Reference
and Administrative Timetable for the Completion of the Healthcare Market Inquiry (Oct. 16, 2015), http://
www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Compettion-Commission-amends-ToR-admin-me
table-for-the-Healthcare-Market-Inquiry.pdf.
135. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Mr., LPG Market Inquiry's Call for Further Submissions (Aug.
27, 2015), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/News-Alert-Call-for-Further-
Submissions.pdf.
136. Department of Economic Development Notice 1035 of 2015, Grocery Retail Sector Market Inquiry
GG No. 39347 (Oct. 30 2015) (S. Afr.), availahle at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/
39347_genl035.pdf.
137. Sasol Chemical Industries Limited v. Competition Commission, 2015 (5) SA 471 (CAC) at 92 para. 186 (S.
Mr.).
138. Press Release, Competition Comm'n S. Afr., Commission Appeals SasolJudgment (July 8, 2015), http:/
/www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Commission-Appeals-Sasol-Judgment.pdf
139. See Robert Legh, Claire Reidy & Chris Green, Competition Appeal Court dismisses appeal against SAB after
decade-long case, LEXOLOGY (July 27, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ea3ecl89-cSbO-
472e-9e0b-Ofa8be027e55.
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The Commission succeeded at the Tribunal in proving that Media 24 had engaged in
exclusionary conduct through low pricing in the local newspaper market.1 40
E. COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that civil actions could not be pursued against
bread manufacturer Premier because the Commission had failed to cite Premier as a
respondent in its referral of the cartel complaint (it had been granted leniency).141
The High Court dismissed an application by Allens Meshco to review the




The enactment of the Consumer Rights Act 2015143 has substantially changed the
landscape for private enforcement of competition law violations.
The Competition Appeal Tribunal's (CAT) jurisdiction has been extended to cover
stand-alone and hybrid claims, in addition to follow-on claims, and to award injunctive
relief.144 In addition, a new form of class action allows cases to be brought on behalf of a
defined group for aggregate damages, with claimants automatically included unless they
specifically opt out.14 These actions may be brought in respect of infringements that
have already been discovered and sanctioned by the UK and EU authorities.14 6 Lastly,
voluntary redress schemes offer up to a 20 percent fine reduction when an undertaking
compensates the losses of those affected by its infringements.147
B. MERGERS
In October, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) provisionally cleared a
merger between major telecom companies BT and EE, having considered whether the
merged company's incentives to continue to supply services to other telecom companies
on a wholesale basis would be affected.148
140. Competition Commission v. Media 24 Limited 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 150 para. 621 (S. Afr.).
141. Premier Foods (Pty) Ltd v. Manoim NO and Others 2016 (1) SA 445 (SCA) at 27 para. 47 (S. Mr.).
142. Allens Meshco Group v. Competition Commission 2015 NGHC 31044/13 at 2, 23 para. 1, 51-54.
143. Consumer Rights Act, 2015, c. 15 (Eng.), available at http://www.legisladon.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/
contents.




147. Competition and Markets Authority, Guidance on the Approval of Voluntary Redress Schemes for
Infringements of Competition Law (Aug. 14, 2015) at 46 para. 3.30, available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/approval-of-redress-schemes-for-competidon-law-infringements.
148. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, CMA Provisionally Clears BT/EE Merger (Oct.
28, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-provisionally-clears-btee-merger.
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
To date, no prosecutions have been brought under the criminal cartel offense that was
introduced in 2014, but in September, a former director was given a suspended custodial
sentence of six months, having plead guilty to the old offense.149 Civil penalties of GBP
382,500 and GBP 735,000 were imposed on Consultant Eye Surgeons Partnership
(CESP)10 and an association of estate and lettings agents,' 5' respectively.
D. COURT DECISIONS
In the Air Cargo litigation, the Court of Appeal struck down economic tort claims,
finding that when a cartelist intends to cause harm to a particular class, a cause of action
against them arises for every member of that class.152 But the possibility of the immediate
victims passing on losses means that there cannot have been intention to harm them, and
expanding the class to cover the whole supply chain would open up "an unknown and
unknowable range of claimants"."'
XIV. United States
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The House Judiciary Committee approved a second bill to amend the Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts to align the standards and processes for Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) or Department of Justice (DOJ) review of proposed mergers and
acquisitions.5 4
B. MERGERS
In February, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
decision that St. Luke's Health System's acquisition of Saltzer Medical Group violated
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, holding that the merger's alleged efficiencies were not
sufficient to rebut the presumptively anticompetitive effects in the Nampa, Idaho market
for adult primary care. 15 5
149. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, Director Sentenced to 6 Months for Criminal
Cartel (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/director-sentenced-to-6-months-for-
criminal-cartel.
150. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, Private Ophthalmology: Investigation Into Ant-
Competitive Information Exchange and Pricing Agreements (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/
conduct-in-the-healthcare-sector.
151. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, Property Sales and Lettings Investigation (Oct. 29,
2015), https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-property-sales-and-lettings-and-their-advertising.
152. Air Canada v. Emerald Supplies Ltd. & Ors, [2015] EWCA (Civ) 1024, [168]-[169] (appeal taken from
EWHC (Ch)) (Eng.).
153. Id.
154. Press Release, Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary Comm. Approves SMARTER Act to Deliver
Predictability to the Merger Review Process (Sept. 30, 2015), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-
releases?ID=38C89060-8CC8-4F1 5-B906-5D391DAB825B.
155. Saint Alphonus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015).
SPRING 2016
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
66 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
The DOJ Antitrust Division filed a suit to block Electrolux's attempted USD 3.3 billion
acquisition of General Electric's appliances division, fearing that the merger of two of the
country's leading home appliance manufacturers would lead to less competition and
higher prices.s6
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The DOJ Antitrust Division secured prison sentences and large criminal fines from its
EX, auto parts, and ocean shipping investigations. Five major banks pleaded guilty and
agreed to pay more than USD 2.7 billion to settle charges they fixed EX and LIBOR
rates.5 7 Three Rabobank traders were found guilty of manipulating LIBOR rates, and
three other employees pleaded guilty.1s8 Thirty-seven companies have pleaded guilty and
agreed to pay over USD 2.6 billion in fines as a result of the ongoing auto parts
investigation.' 5 9 For their roles in a conspiracy to fix prices, allocate customers, and rig
bids of international ocean shipping services, four executives have pleaded guilty and been
sentenced to prison, and three corporations have pleaded guilty and paid more than USD
136 million in fines.1 60
Barclays, in the LIBOR investigation,161 and Kayaba, in the auto parts investigation,1 62
were granted fine reductions for instituting effective, forward-looking antitrust
compliance programs.
D. DOMINANCE
The DOJ won its case against American Express; the court ruled that the company's
"anti-steering" rules prohibiting merchants from encouraging customers to use other
credit cards violate antitrust law.163
Cardinal Health agreed to pay USD 26.8 million to resolve FTC charges that it illegally
monopolized markets for sale and distribution of low-energy radiopharmaceuticals, a
156. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Files Antitrust Lawsuit to Stop Electrolux from
Buying GE's Appliance Bus. (July 1, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jusice-department-files-antitrust-
lawsuit-stop-electrolux-buying-general-electrics-appliance.
157. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 20,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas.
158. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of justice, Two Former Rabobank Traders Convicted for Manipulating U.S.
Dollar, Yen LIBOR Interest Rates (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.jusice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-rabobank-
traders-convicted-manipulating-us-dollar-yen-libor-interest-rates.
159. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Japanese Auto Parts Executives Indicted for Bid-Rigging
Conspiracy Involving Body Sealing Products Installed in U.S. Cars (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/three-japanese-auto-parts-execuives-indicted-bid-rigging-conspiracy-involving-body-sealing.
160. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fourth Ocean Shipping Executive Pleads Guilty to Price
Fixing on Ocean Shipping Services for Cars and Trucks (Mar. 26, 2015) at 2, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
fourth-ocean-shipping-execudve-pleads-guilty-price-fixing-ocean-shipping-services-cars-and.
161. Plea Agreement, United States v. Barclays PLC (D. Conn. May 2015), at 9-10, http://www.justice.gov/
file/440481/download.
162. U.S. Sentencing Memorandum & Motion for a Downward Departure at 8, 11-13, United States v.
Kayaba Indus. Co., Ltd., No. 1:15-CR-00098 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2015).
163. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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settlement that drew dissents from two commissioners who did not think disgorgement
was appropriate.1 64
E. COURT DECISIONS
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, the United States Supreme
Court held that the activity of a state-sanctioned professional board controlled by active
market participants is not entitled to state action immunity unless the board is following a
clearly articulated state policy to replace competition with regulation, and the board acts
under active state supervision.16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a decision that
found that Apple violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with book
publishers to raise, fix, and stabilize the retail price of e-books.1 66 The Second Circuit
held that Apple was the "vertical player" in a "horizontal conspiracy" between the book
publishers, and because the shift to an agency model enabled the publishers to coordinate
and raise prices, Apple facilitated a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy.1 67
164. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Cardinal Health Agrees to Pay $26.8 Million to Settle Charges It
Monopolized 25 Markets for the Sale of Radiopharmaceuticals to Hospitals and Clinics (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/04/cardinal-health-agrees-pay-268-nmillion-settle-
charges-it.
165. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. F.T.C., 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
166. United States v. Apple, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).
167. Id.
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